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FILLING THE PROCEDURAL VOID AFTER
SITE ACQUISITION
Shannon and other homeowners and tenants, black and white, of the
East Poplar Urban Renewal Area of Philadelphia sought to enjoin the
Department of Housing and Urban Development from issuing a con-
tract of insurance, and a contract for rent supplement payments2 for
the development of a 221(d) (3) apartment project 3 in their area. The
nature of this project differed from that originally conceived in the
first Urban Renewal Plan for East Poplar in that the first plan did
not provide for the development of any rental units.4 The original
plan was amended on five occasions over a span from 1958 to 1964,
when, after a public hearing, federal funds were alloted for the acqui-
sition of the project site.5 Throughout the amending process, no sub-
stantial change was made in the plan with regard to the type of hous-
ing to be developed; all units were to be single or multi-family, owner-
occupied dwellings, either new or rehabilitated.6 The commercial
developer, who worked under the authority of a non-profit sponsor
to build the owner-occupied dwellings, failed to complete even one-
third of the new units, and some of those that were to have been
rehabilitated had been vandalized. 7 The Regional Administrator of
the Department of Housing and Urban Development approved with-
1. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, 12 U.S.C. § 1715(l) (d) (5),
1717(b).
2. Id. § 1701(s)(h)(1) (A).
3. Id. § 1715(1) (d) (3). For a discussion of the evolution of the 221(d) (3) pro-
gram through the various federal housing acts see F. KAIsER, THE REPORT OF THE
PRESUDNT'S COMmrrTEE ON URBAN HOUSING: A DECENT HOME 61-65 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as KAsER].
4. The original urban renewal plan, adopted in 1959, called for a combination
of rehabilitation of structures by property owners in part of the area, and of site
acquisition in another part. Within the tract to be required structures deemed
non-salvageable were to be cleared, and salvageable structures were to be con-
veyed to a redeveloper for rehabilitation as single-family and multi-family owner-
occupied dwellings. Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 814 (3d Cir. 1970).
5. Id. at 813.
6. Id. at 814.
7. Id.
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out a public hearings and without an R215 Report on Minority Con-
siderations,9 the razing of the vandalized buildings and an offer by
the developer to the Local Public Agency (LPA) to construct, in
place of the owner-occupied dwellings, a 221(d)(3) project using
federal funds for rent supplements and mortgage insurance.
The plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the location of this type of
project on the site chosen would have the effect of increasing the al-
ready high concentration of low income blacks and, further, that
HUD had no procedures for consideration of such an effect in review-
ing and approving this type of project. The District Court of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania entered a final judgment dismissing
the complaint.10 The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit,
vacated the judgment and remanded the cause for entry of an injunc-
tive order.:" In its opinion, the appellate court held that the Regional
Agency of Housing and Urban Development
must utilize some institutionalized method whereby, in consider-
ing site selection or type selection, it has before it the relevant
racial and socio-economic information necessary for compliance
with its duties under the 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights Acts.12 (Em-
phasis added)
In light of the Shannon decision, what, if any, are the procedural
requirements for a change in a renewal project plan after acquisition
of the project site?
The law is not as clear on what procedures are required of the local
agency to effect a change in project type as it is in approving plans
for the acquisition of sites for federally subsidized renewal programs.
Before federal funds may be used to acquire a project site, the LPA
must hold a public hearing, 3 the purpose of which is to "give the
public in an affected area an opportunity to be heard ... before the
8. "No land for any project to be assisted under this sub-chapter shall be
acquired by the local public agency except after public hearing following notice
of the date, time, place, and purpose of such hearing." 42 U.S.C. § 1455(d)
(1949).
9. An R-215 Report on Minority Group Considerations contains an explana-
tion of the projected effect of the project on minority group families within and
without the project area. Urban Renewal Handbook, RHA 7207.1, ch. 5, § 2
(as existed before rescission and modification in Feb. 1970).
10. Shannon v. HUD, 305 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Pa. 1969), revd, 436 F.2d
809 (3d Cir. 1970).
11. 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
12. Id. at 821.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (1949).
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LPA enter[s] into a contract for federal financial aid."'14 (Emphasis
added) The law on its face seems clear that once a public hearing
has been held and is followed by the acquisition of the site property,
the letter, if not the spirit, of 1455 (d) is fulfilled.15
This procedure is not ineffective in fulfilling its purpose of letting
the public be heard, and it permits the public to hear the plan. 8
Some of the cases show that substantive issues are formulated at the
point of acquisition, 7 a fact which may be attributable to the ex-
posure and exchange of information that occurs at the 1455 (d) hear-
ing. Yet, is that one-time confrontation of competing interests a suffi-
cient procedure for fulfilling the planning obligations imposed upon
HUD programs under the policies of the new Civil Rights and Fair
Housing acts?' 8 Is it a guard against a discriminatory effect?
HUD receives the information used to make its project approvals
from the LPA. Therefore, if at the site acquisition hearing, the infor-
mation conveyed by citizens to the LPA and from the LPA to HUD is
considered acceptable from a planning viewpoint, then the site is ac-
14. 436 F.2d at 813.
15. In Green Street Ass'n v. Daley, 250 F. Supp. 139 (N.D. Ill. 1966),
aff'd, 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1967), the agency conducted a 1455(d) hearing prior
to acquisition of land for an urban renewal project. The letter of the law was
thereby fulfilled. It is dubious, however, whether the spirit of the law as ex-
pressed by the Shannon court and the legislative history of the statute was em-
braced by the Green Street court where the plaintiffs alleged that notice of the
hearing was inadequate and that testimony and evidence which they proffered
was denied admission. Green Street held on the hearing issue that the plaintiffs
did not have an interest which was adversely affected by the manner in which
the hearing was conducted because they were not the direct recipients of the
project funds which constituted the object for which the hearing was being held.
While funds are the immediate tangible interest, it is difficult to assume that
the project itself is not the ultimate interest of which the plaintiffs are the ulti-
mate beneficiaries, which fact the Green Street court admits but does not con-
sider a requisite aspect of the public hearing. What public is more affected than
those who live or will live in and around the project area?
16. 24 C.F.R. § 1.9 (1970).
17. See Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920(2d Cir. 1968); Powelton Civic Homeowners Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809
(E.D. Pa. 1968); Green Street Ass'n v. Daley, 250 F. Supp. 139 (N.D. Ill.
1966), av'd, 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1967); El Cortez Heights Residents and
Property Owners Ass'n v. Tucson Housing Auth., 10 Ariz. App. 132, 457 P.2d
297 (1969).
18. The Shannon court sets out an excellent review of the Civil Rights and
Fair Housing policy evolution from a position of neutrality to the present affirma-
tive policy of non-discriminatory effect. See 436 F.2d at 816.
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quired and federal funding begins. 9 There is a procedural void, how-
ever, in a situation like the Shannon case, where a planning change
occurs after the acquisition of the project site.
As the Shannon court points out, the Urban Renewal Handbook
provides that a modification in the urban renewal plan may require
a new 1455 (d) hearing.2 0 But the Handbook provision does not make
explicit the criteria for determining what magnitude of change is
necessary to trigger the holding of a new hearing. There are no other
published regulations regarding the time for or manner of conduct-
ing 1455 (d) hearings. As a result, the opportunity for a rehearing
on the project after a modification in the plan has been made is com-
pletely within the discretion of the agency.
In the Shannon situation, HUD used, as an alternative to rehearing,
a "red line"21 procedure. By this method, the change in the renewal
contract has no public exposure prior to approval by the Regional
Administrator of HUD. The court, however, did not find "red lining"
to be a sufficient method of plan modification approval.22
The procedural due process that is required of HUD officials in
urban renewal planning is delineated in Powelton Civic Homeowners
Association v. HUD.23 There, the court found that neither the Hous-
ing Act 24 which authorized the Urban Renewal Program nor the Con-
stitution explicitly or implicitly requires an adjudicatory or legislative
hearing before the HUD Secretary.25 It did find, however, that,
[i]f the Secretary's decision is to be truly protective of the public
and private interests recognized by the Housing Act, he must
afford the plaintiffs an opportunity equal to that available to the
Redevelopment authority to submit written and documentary
19. For a general explanation of the approval procedure of the Secretary of
HUD, see Powelton Civic Homeowners Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809, 831
(E.D. Pa. 1968).
20. Urban Renewal Handbook, RHA 7206.1, ch. 3 (1970 ed.).
21. The Shannon court cited a memorandum dated Dec. 29, 1966, which was
sent from HUD Assistant Regional Administration to the LPA which sets out
an informal method for approving minor changes in an Urban Renewal Plan.
Two criteria are considered before making a "red line" change:
(1) Whether the change constitutes a material alteration in a basic element
of the plan; and,
(2) Whether or not the change is acceptable to us from a planning viewpoint.
See 436 F.2d at 815.
22. Id. at 821.
23. 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
24. Housing Act of 1949, § 2-114, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1465;
particularly § 105(d), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1455(d).
25. 284 F. Supp. at 813.
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evidence on the legality of the plan. We would not attempt to
substitute our planning judgment for that of the Secretary; but
we do believe that the Secretary must base his decisions on a com-
plete record expressing the views of all recognizd interests if he
is to fulfill his planning function under the Housing Act.2 6
The distinction between Powelton and Shannon which is noted by
the Shannon court is that the Powelton plaintiffs were challenging the
adequacy of relocation procedures specifically provided for in the
Housing Act,2 7 while in Shannon the plaintiffs were challenging the
adequacy of HUD procedures generally to prevent racial concentra-
tion . ' In both cases, however, the plaintiffs asked for injunctions
against the federal funding of urban renewal projects because of pro-
cedural inadequacies in their approval. The real distinction between
Powelton and Shannon is a matter of emphasis. A claim which arises
at the point of acquisition compels the question, "What are the effects
of putting the project in this area?" After acquisition of the site, the
question must become, "What are the effects of putting this project in
the area?"
It is, perhaps, the lack of statutory and regulatory post-acquisition
guidelines that caused the Shannon court to reject the Powelton rule
requiring that the residents of an affected area have the opportunity
to be heard and to reason that,
[i]n this case that judgment to be made by HUD is quasi-legis-
lative. So long as it adopts some adecjuate institutional means
for marshaling the appropriate legislative facts the rights of af-
fected residents will be adequately protected, we think, by the
opportunity to obtain judical review pursuant to the Administra-
tive Procedure Act after the agency decision.2 9
Shannon, therefore, does not require that HUD provide a hearing for
every planning change, 30 nor a minority report,31 nor does it require
that residents in the area be given the opportunity to be heard.3 2
The holding does suggest, however, that "appropriate legislative facts"
must include "relevant racial and socio-economic" information.33 If
26. Id. at 831-32.
27. Id. at 821.
28. 436 F.2d at 812.
29. Id. at 821.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Note 16 supra and accompanying text.
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HUD can inform itself on the social and economic ramifications of a
particular change in planning without contacting the people affected,
that is judicially acceptable according to the Shannon ruling. But if
there is no procedure for exposing the change publicly to the residents
and for receiving their response, it is difficult to perceive how the
social factors can be determined. Such a ruling puts a great deal of
credence in social statistics and their causal relation to a particular
social or racial effect. Shannon has tread a tightrope between a flat
hearing requirement and total agency discretion under the "red line"
procedure. The court concludes that the agency must do more than
rely on simplistic memoranda from the LPA.34 HUD has the affirma-
tive duty to keep itself informed after acquisition on any project
change which affects not only land-use,35 but also social composition
or racial concentration36 In essence, the agency is to perform a bal-
ancing test
which weighs the alternatives and finds that the need for physical
rehabilitation or additional minority housing at the site in ques-
tion dearly outweighs the disadvantage of increasing or perpetuat-
ing racial concentration.37
There are two points of wisdom in the Shannon decision. First, by
not requiring one specific procedure, the court has realistically en-
visioned the procedural vacuum which could arise from an agency's
compliance with the letter of the law (a hearing is held) and non-
compliance with the spirit (the agency maintains its deafness in the
face of unfavorable hearing evidence). Instead, under the Shannon
rule, the burden of proof is on HUD to demonstrate that it has con-
sidered the "relevant racial and socio-economic factors."' s Perhaps,
34. 436 F.2d. at 821.
35. Id. at 820.
36. Note 16 supra and accompanying text.
37. 436 F.2d at 822.
38. Without in any way attempting to limit the agency in the exercise of its
own administrative expertise, we suggest that some consideration relevant to a
proper determination by HUD include the following:
1. What procedures were used by the LPA in considering the effects on
racial concentration when it made a choice of site or of type of housing?
2. What tenant selection methods will be employed with respect to the
proposed project?
3. How has the LPA or the local governing body historically reacted to pro-
posals for low income housing outside areas of racial concentration?
4. Where is low-income housing, both public and publicly assisted, now lo-
cated in the geographic area of the LPA?
5. Where is middle income and luxury housing, in particular middle income
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by not explaining the term "relevant," the courts will find HUD even
more cautious and thorough in its social fact-finding than if they des-
ignate a line of demarcation between relevant and irrelevant. Second,
the Shannon court carefully avoided encroaching on the agency's
expertise in the choosing of methods which yield the "best" planning
information. Although such an indefinite procedural standard could
lead to unnecessary litigation, it does permit the agency to design its
own mode of information gathering according to the particular char-
acter of a specific renewal project.
The Shannon ruling could also lead to abuse. As it stands, no pub.
lic hearing or documentation is explicitly required after the 1455 (d)
hearing is held. Should there be a revision in the development con-
tract, as in the instant case, HUD could make a determination upon
consideration of social factors which if exposed in hearing, would
show those which seemed to be immaterial, to be material, socially and
economically. In many instances, this could mean that by the time
HUD has seen its planning error, federal funds would already have
been expended between the holding of the "straw" 1455 (d) hearing
and the realization that the planning change materially affected the
racial concentration or some other required planning consideration."9
A second problem, mentioned above, is that of reliance upon social
factors in predicting a specific effect. Here, for instance, the court
presumed that a 221(d) (3) program would have the same sound
composition as a low income housing project. 40 However, the
221(d) (3) program does not require that all tenants wanting to live
and luxury housing with federal mortgage insurance guarantees, located in
the geographic area of the LPA?
6. Are some low-income housing projects in the geographic area of the LPA
occupied primarily by tenants of one race, and if so, where are they located?
7. What is the projected racial composition of tenants of the proposed
project?
8. Will the project house school age children and if so what schools will
they attend and what is the racial balance in those schools?
9. Have the zoning and other land use regulations of the local governing
body in the geographic area of the LPA had the effect of confining low income
housing to certain areas, and if so, how has this affected racial concentration?
10. Are there alternative available sites?
11. At the site selected by the LPA how severe is the need for restoration
and are other alternative means of restoration available which would have
preferable effects on racial concentration in that area?
Id. at 821-22.
39. See El Cortez Heights Residents and Property Owners Ass'n v. Tucson
Housing Auth., 10 Ariz. App. 132, 457 P.2d 297 (1969).
40. 436 F.2d at 820.
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in the project qualify for rent supplements. 41 Individuals from the
public market may also rent in the project. Although HUD pre-
sumed a different result than did the Shannon court, where an agency
is responsible for the effects of its planning decisions, the procedural
standards should have more than a presumptive basis.
Richard Hunt Evans
41. KAISER at 62-65.
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